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Abstract--This paper presents a conceptual nd mathematical model of the process of satisficing 
decision making under multiple objectives in which the information about decision maker's 
preferences i expressed in the form of aspiration levels. The mathematical concept of a value 
(utility) function is modified to describe satisficing behavior; the modified value function 
(achievement scalarizing function) should possess the properties of order preservation and order 
approximation. It is shown that the mathematical basis formed using aspiration levels and 
achievement scalarizing functions can be used not only for satisficing decision making but also 
for Pareto optimization, and thus provides an alternative to approaches based on weighting 
coefficients or typical value functions. This mathematical basis, which can also be regarded as a 
generalization f the goal programming approach in multiobjective optimization, suggests prag- 
matic approaches tomany problems in multiobjective analysis. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to provide a mathematical background for satisficing decision 
making. Although it is assumed that the reader is acquainted both with the methodology 
behind the idea of satisficing decision making [1] and with the state of the art of 
optimization decision making and multiattribute decision analysis [2-8], some of the 
main features of these two approaches are briefly summarized below. 
The basic questions in multiattribute decision analysis or multiobjective optimization 
may take various forms [9-11], but can be summarized as follows: 
Is the maximization of a value (utility) function an adequate model for typical decision-making 
processes? If the rationality of a decision is restricted by various institutional aspects, how do we 
best model the decision-making process mathematically? 
The development of the classic apparatus of multicriteria optimization, preference 
relations, utility, and value theory, beginning with Pareto in 1896 and culminating with 
Debreu in 1959, has been strongly related to economic theory. However,  economic 
theory is concerned with averages of thousands of decisions; the individual consumer is 
a mathematical construction in which institutional factors and personal preferences have 
been averaged out. More recent developments of this theory take restrictions into 
account by introducing additional constraints and examining the restricted rationality of 
the decision-making process [12]. 
On the other hand, most individual decisions are made within an organizational 
structure. Even when choosing goods in a supermarket,  an individual consumer often 
has a shopping list composed with the help of his family, and his own rationality of 
choice is modified by this list. When buying new equipment, a factory manager is 
restricted by various environmental nd safety standards. It is possible to express such 
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restrictions by additional constraints to utility maximization, although this is not neces- 
sarily the best way to deal with them. 
This fact has been recognized by many economic theorists, including Boulding [13] 
and March and Simon [1], and an alternative approach to decision making has been 
developed. In the satisficing approach, the decision is based not on the maximization of a 
utility or value function, but on reaching certain aspiration levels. Much methodological 
reflection and analysis support his approach. 
More recently, interest in decision analysis has been stimulated by systems analytical 
problems with wide-ranging economic, technological, sociological, and environmental 
objectives and constraints. Not all such objectives can be formulated mathematically. 
Even if this is possible, the resulting utility or value functions do not usually have a 
straightforward objective meaning but reflect the rather subjective preferences of a 
decision maker or a group of experts. Although there have been attempts to use the 
satisficing approach in systems analysis, most of the detailed studies on decision analysis 
[2, 5, 7] have been concerned largely with preferences and utility theory. There have also 
been many successful applications of this theory; the results are particularly good if the 
alternatives being compared are given explicitly, if there are not too many of them, and 
if the problem is basically to compare the sociological, environmental, and economic 
consequences of the various options. 
However, it has been realized that while evaluating iven alternatives i an important 
task, it is even more important o generate alternatives. For example, the mathematical 
models used in economic and sociological planning are capable of describing an infinite 
number of alternatives and their consequences; it is necessary to use these models to 
generate a restricted number of explicit alternatives of interest o the decision maker. 
This problem is related to satisficing rather than to optimizing, and many researchers in
multiobjective optimization have felt the need for an appropriate mathematical for- 
mulation. Sakluvadze [14, 15], Yu and Leitmann [16], and others have considered the use 
of utopia (or ideal) points (representing unattainable aspiration levels) as reference 
points for generating alternatives. Charnes and Cooper [3], Dyer [17], Kornbluth [18], 
Ignizio [19], and others have developed a method called goal programming, which 
involves the use of aspiration levels for objectives in the process of multicriteria 
optimization. Yet these and related works have not had the impact they deserve, for 
several reasons. 
First, although many partial results have been obtained, the mathematical basis of the 
satisficing approach and the relationship between satisficing decisions and optimal 
decisions have not yet been fully developed. Thus, any approach based on the use of 
reference objectives has been regarded as a somewhat less scientific, ad hoc approach. 
It was not clear whether it would be possible to develop a consistent, basic theory of 
multiobjective optimization and decision making starting with aspiration levels for 
objectives rather than with weighting coefficients or value (utility) functions. This would 
mean that the necessary and sufficient conditions, existence conditions, relations to 
preference orderings, and so on would have to be formulated in terms of aspiration 
levels or reference objectives. Some more abstract aspects of this question have been 
analyzed by the author in earlier work [11, 20-23]; a synthesis of relevant results is 
presented in this paper. 
Second, although many researchers realized that there was a connection between 
satisficing decision making and such approaches as goal programming (see, e.g., [19]), 
some basic methodological questions have remained unanswered. What can be logically 
assumed about the decision-making process in a simple organization? Whose pref- 
erences hould be modelled? What is the relationship between satisJicing decision making 
and utility or value maximization? 
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The main purpose of this paper is to analyze methodological questions of this type 
and to develop the underlying mathematical theory. 
2. A METHODOLOGICAL HYPOTHESIS 
The following conceptual model is assumed to describe the decision-making process 
in a simple organization. The organization consists of a top decision maker (or a group of 
decision makers treated here as a single uni0 called the boss, and technical or profes- 
sional employees, again considered here as a single unit called the staff. The boss 
formulates a decision problem for the staff, and asks them to prepare one or more 
courses of action which would attain certain goals; he formulates the goals in terms of 
aspiration levels for several objectives. The staff then examines the possibilities in detail, 
checks whether the aspiration levels are attainable, and proposes detailed plans of 
action. The boss can either accept a proposed plan and decide to execute it, or change 
his requirements so that the staff must prepare new plans. 
It is now necessary to make some assumptions concerning the decision-making 
process in an ideal organization--these then result in a relatively simple mathematical 
model of the organization. 
First, it is assumed that the goals are clearly and completely perceived. In other words, 
the boss and the staff must have the same objectives, including those which might be 
more important for the staff but less so for the boss, and have a common understanding 
of what it means to improve each of the objectives. This does not mean that the boss 
and the staff should have the same preferences on various objectives; they need not 
agree on details, only on principles. It might also be necessary for the boss to specify 
aspiration levels for all objectives, even for those which he perceives as less important. 
In particular, the resources (budget, time, etc.) allocated by the boss to a given problem 
could usefully be treated as objectives rather than constraints, so that the suggested 
resource allocations would then become aspiration levels. 
Mathematically, this assumption means that the boss and the staff consider the same 
objective space and have the same notion of a natural inequality in this space (the same 
partial preordering) but not necessarily the same preference structure (not the same 
complete preordering). The aspiration levels set by the boss form a reference point in the 
objective space. To simplify the discussion, it might be agreed that all objectives are 
improved if their levels are raised; this corresponds to Pareto maximization or to the 
natural partial ordering generated by the natural positive cone in the objective space. 
However, it is also possible to analyze more complicated situations. 
Second, it is assumed that the boss is consistent. This means that he cannot prefer any 
plan in which one of the objectives has a smaller value than in alternative plans, 
everything else being equal. Mathematically, this means that his preference mapping 
(complete preordering) is strictly monotonic in the sense of the natural inequality in 
objective space (i.e., it preserves the partial preordering of the space). Apart from this 
requirement, his preferences may be purely arbitrary. 
Third, it is assumed that the staff is dedicated and efficient. The term "dedication" 
when applied to the staff has the same meaning as "consistency" when applied to the 
boss: the preferences of the staff must increase as the objectives of the planned action 
improve, although the detailed pattern of these preferences might differ from that of the 
boss. Efficiency means something more: the staff actually maximizes the preferences and 
proposes only nondominated plans, in which no single objective can be improved 
without impairing others. (The term "nondominated" is preferred here to "Pareto 
optimal," which has a more specific meaning, or "efficient," which implies only 
economic efficiency.) Mathematically, this assumption means that the staff preferences 
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mapping not only strictly preserves the partial preordering of the objective space, but is 
also maximized uring the preparation of plans. 
Fourth, it is assumed that the staff takes the aspiration levels seriously and strives to 
attain them. This assumption is crucial in describing the satisficing behavior in the 
organization and the limited rationality of choice open to the staff. To illustrate the 
implications of this assumption, consider the three possible situations that could arise in 
response to a given problem. 
If the aspiration levels given by the boss can be exceeded, the staff is free to use its 
own preferences to select a plan, although their freedom is restricted to the margin 
above the aspiration levels. The staff should not bother the boss with too many questions 
about how to allocate the surplus; one or more detailed plans should be presented for the 
boss' approval, all of which should be nondominated as required by the third assumption. 
If the aspiration levels are unattainable, the staff must choose plans which match 
these levels as closely as possible. The meaning of "closeness" is left for the staff to 
decide; again they should not bother the boss too much. 
The simplest but most important case is when the aspiration levels may just be 
attained without any excess. In this case staff rationality is severely modified: the staff 
must propose at least one plan with outcomes that precisely match the boss' wishes 
(fourth assumption), although they could also propose alternative plans. Since it is the 
boss' prerogative to choose and accept plans or to ask for new plans with altered 
aspiration levels to be prepared, the fourth assumption really implies that he fully 
controls the organization, and need not be affected by the preferences of the staff. 
Any mathematical description of the fourth assumption must reflect his modification 
of staff rationality. It will be shown later that this assumption can be represented by the 
following axiom of order approximation: 
the set of objective outcomes preferred by the staff to the aspiration levels given by the boss must 
closely approximate the set of outcomes that are obviously better than the required aspiration 
levels (in the agreed partial preordering sense). 
This axiom has a straightforward interpretation: to avoid a conflict of preferences close 
to the aspiration levels, the perfect staff should keep to the agreed principles of what is 
naturally better, and should not guess or bargain about what might be marginally better. 
Clearly, all of the assumptions listed above describe an ideal organization which will 
almost never occur in practice (with one important exception, see below). Staff members 
do bargain with their bosses, bosses are not necessarily consistent in their decisions, and 
so on. However, this model of an ideal organization could serve as a basis which could 
then be modified to include deviations from ideal behavior. 
It could also be argued that this model is too idealized to describe satisficing decision 
making in organizations: the main reason for accepting satisficing decisions is usually 
that there is no time for proper optimization, and therefore the assumption that the staff 
is efficient could be challenged. However, it is possible to define "conditional efficiency" 
which takes into account he time allocated for the staff to prepare the plan. Moreover, 
the staff is not required to optimize a global value function for the entire organization; 
this task is reserved for the boss, and can be done by changing aspiration levels if he 
wishes. The assumption of efficiency really means only that the staff should not 
propose dominated plans of action with outcomes that can clearly be improved. 
A useful approach in analyzing an ideal organization of this type is to study a class of 
functions describing the preferences of the staff under its modified rationality of choice. 
These are, in a sense, modified value functions. However, these functions must express 
both the utility of exceeding the aspiration levels and the disutility of not achieving these 
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levels. Moreover, these functions must reflect he axiom of order approximation implied 
by the fourth assumption. These functions therefore depend explicitly and nonlinearly 
on the assumed aspiration levels, and will be called achievement scalarizing functions, 
following the terminology of goal programming and reference point optimization [19, 21]. 
There are several reasons for studying this class of functions. 
First, although the boss can control the ideal organization regardless of the particular 
achievement scalarizing function characterizing the staff (provided that it fulfills the 
basic criteria), the shape of this function might influence the ease of interaction between 
the boss and the staff. This subject requires further theoretical and experimental study; 
only a few examples are considered in this paper. 
Second, a detailed study of the ideal organization might serve as a starting point for 
the investigation of slightly different problems: hierarchical organizations in which the 
boss is himself a member of the staff of a higher-level manager; negotiation of aspiration 
levels between groups of decision makers; inclusion of additional objectives by the staff, 
uncertainty in either the boss' requirements or the staff's responses, etc. 
Third, there is one important special case where the ideal organization described 
above might exist in practice: an interactive link between a computer user (the boss) and 
a computerized multiobjective optimization model (the staff). Traditionally the computer 
user specifies various scenarios as model inputs and analyzes the outcomes. However, 
the concept of an ideal organization suggests an alternative approach. The user specifies 
the model outputs that play the role of objectives, the natural inequality in the objective 
space, and the model inputs (parameters, cenarios, etc.) that may be changed during 
optimization. An achievement scalarizing function and an optimization procedure which 
maximizes this function are also chosen. The user then specifies certain model outputs 
as aspiration levels; the system responds by stating whether these outputs are attainable 
or not and proposes one or more alternatives. These should be close to the desired result 
in the unattainable case, better than the desired result in the over-attainable case, and 
should exactly match the desired result when this, is just attainable. By changing his 
requirements, the user can obtain various proposals from the model. 
3. MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Let Eo C E be the set of admissible decisions or alternatives to be evaluated. Let G be 
a (linear topological) space of objectives, performance indices, or outcomes. Let a 
mapping Q:Eo-~G be given, which defines numerically the consequences of each 
alternative. Let Qo = Q(Eo) denote the set of attainable objectives. Let a natural 
inequality (a partial preordering) in G be given; to simplify the presentation, assume that 
the preordering is transitive and can be expressed by a positive cone (any closed, 
convex, proper cone) D ~ G: 
ql, q: E G, ql -< q2 ¢~ q2 - -  ql E O. (1 )  
A corresponding strong partial preordering is given by a 
ql, q2 E G, ql < q2 ¢:~ q2 - ql ~ ~ at D\(D A - D). (2) 
If the cone D has a nonempty interior/~, it is also possible to introduce a strict partial 
preordering: 
ql, q2 ~ G, ql ~ q2¢:~ q2 - ql E ~). (3) 
Here ~ denotes a defining equation. 
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Suppose that we maximize all objectives (gains, etc.). A generalized Pareto (non- 
dominated) objective ~ is then a D-maximal element of Q0: 
~ Q0 is D-maximal ¢~ Q0 o (t~ +/5) = 0. (4) 
A slightly weaker definition, which includes a few points which are not nondominated, is 
that of weak D-maximal elementsb: 
~ Q0 is weakly D-maximal ¢* Q0 n (~ +/~) = 0. (5) 
For a normed space G, we can also have a stronger definition (D,-maximality) which 
does not include all nondominated points: 
E Q0 is D,-maximal ¢:~ Q0 n (t~ - / ) , )  = 0, (6) 
where D, is an e-conical neighborhood of D: 
D, d____f{q E G : dist(q, D) < ellqll}; t3. a D,\(D. n -D . )  (7) 
with 
dist(q, D)  = inf IIq - ql l  
qED 
implied by the norm of the space G. 
If the space G is normed, we can also define an achievement scalarizing function 
(shortened to achievement function) s :G ~R 1, where s is assumed to satisfy either (8) 
and (10) below (the order representation case) or (9) and (11) below (the order ap- 
proximation case). Thus, an achievement function should be 
(a) strictly order-preserving: for all C/~ G, all ql, q2E Q0: 
q~ ~ q2 ~ s(ql - 4) < s(q2- c/), (8) 
or, if possible, strongly order-preserving: for all g/E G, all q~, q2E Qo: 
q~ < q2 ~ s(ql - ~/) < s(q2- ~/), (9) 
where strong order preservation implies strict order preservation. 
Co) order-representing: 
Soa-a-~{q E G : s(q - q ->0} = 4 + D; s(O) = O, (10) 
or, at least, order-approximating for some small ¢ > O, 
( /+DC S0a{q E G : s(q-  (I)->O}C ( /+Dr;  s(O)=O, (11) 
where, clearly, order representation implies order approximation. 
b The concepts of D-maximality, weak D-maximality, and D~-maximality depend on the definition of the 
cone D. If this cone is properly chosen these ideas can be used to make many detailed istinctions between 
different notions of efficiency. 
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Requirements (a) and (b) both have two formulations; it is easy to show that (9) and (10) 
are incompatible, and hence we require that either (8) and (10) or (9) and (11) should be 
satisfied simultaneously. 
Observe that the achievement function s is taken to be a function of the difference 
q -  (1, where q = Q(x) ,  x E Eo is an attainable objective but (1 E G is an arbitrary 
aspiration level, which is not constrained to Q0, nor otherwise constrained. Moreover, an 
achievement function is usually constructed such that, if (1 ~ Q0- D, then the maximiza- 
tion of s(q - (1) over q E Q0 represents the minimization of the distance between (1 + D 
and Q0; if (1 E Q0- D, then the maximization of s(q - (1) represents the allocation of the 
surplus q - (1  ~ D. However, these comments are only descriptive and the axiomatic 
definition of an achievement function relies on requirements (a) and (b). 
Requirement (a) results directly in a sufficient condition for Pareto-maximality, and 
the following well-known lemma holds [24] (see also refs. 21 and 25): 
Lemma 1. If s is strongly order-preserving, then its maximal points in q E Q0 are 
D-maximal: 
4 = arg max s(q - (1) ~ Qo n (4 - / ) )  = O. (12) 
qEQo 
If s is strictly order-preserving, then its maximal points are weakly D-maximal. 
Requirement (b) results in a necessary condition for Pareto-maximality which is much 
stronger than the known conditions based on weighting coefficients. The following 
lemma was first given by the author in a less general formulation [21]: 
Lemma 2. If s is both order-preserving (qt --- q2 =~ s(ql - (1) <- s (q2-  (1) for any ql, q2, 
(1) and order-representing and if (1 = 4 is (weakly) D-maximal, then the maximum of s 
over q E Q0 is attained at (1 = 4 and is equal to zeroC: 
Qo n (~ + 3)  = O =::), 4 E Arg max [s (q  - 4)]; max [s(q  - 4)] = 0. 
q~Oo qEQo 
(13) 
If s is order-preserving and order-approximating for a given ~ > 0 and if (1 = 4 is 
/),-maximal, then the maximum of s over Q0 is also attained at q = 4 and is equal to 
zero, so that (13) holds with/~ substituted by/5,.  
The proof of Lemma 2 for an order-approximating function s is as follows. Suppose 
4~ Arg max [s(q - 4)]; then there is 4 ~ Qo such that 
qEQ0 
S(4  -- 4 )  > S(4  -- 4 )  ---- 0. 
In other words, 4 ~ S0 = {q E G : s(q - q) > 0}. Clearly, S0 C 4 + D, by the assumption of 
order approximation. However, 4 ~ 4 + (D, n -D, ) ,  since 4 E 4 + (D~ N - /9,)  = 
(4 + D, )n  (4 -  D,) would imply s (4 -  4 )= 0 by the assumption of order preservation. 
Thus, 4 E 4 +/ ) ,  and 4 E Q0, which contradicts the assumption that Q0 n (4 +/) , )  is 
empty. The modification of this proof for an order-representing function s is obvious. A 
strictly or strongly order-preserving function must be order-preserving, and hence the 
assumptions of Lemma 2 are satisfied for all achievement functions. 
c We use Arg max or Arg rain to indicate the set of maximum orminimum points of a function, and arg max 
or arg rain if this set is a singleton. 
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Observe that Lemma 2 is a necessary condition for D-maximality (or D,-maximality) 
even for nonconvex  sets  Q0; the geometrical interpretation of this condition is that sets 
Q0 and c~ +/5 are separated at c] by a cone So (see Fig. 1). 
Observe also that it is really requirement (b) that mathematically distinguishes an 
achievement function from a value function; the latter is usually assumed to satisfy 
requirement (a). We conclude that the results obtained using requirements (a) and (b) 
and the resulting Lemmas 1 and 2 are more fundamental than the results derived using 
weighting coefficients. For example, Lemma 2 can be used to check the attainability and 
Pareto-optimality of a given (/~ G, as follows: if an order-representing and order- 
preserving function s (q  - (1) is maximized, and (/is unattainable, then 
max [ s (q  - <])] < O; 
q~Qo 
if ~ is attainable and weakly Pareto-optimal, then 
max [ s (q  - 4)] = O; 
q~Qo 
if ~ is attainable but not weakly Pareto-optimal, then 
max [ s (q  - C/)] > O. 
q~Qo 
It is not possible to make checks of this type using weighting coefficients or typical value 
or utility functions. 
However, note that weighting coefficients h are defined at the maximal points ~ of 
every order-preserving function (value, utility, or achievement function), provided that it 
is differentiable: 
= os(q.~q- O)/l[~s(q./ aq- 4)11; ~ ~ D* = (X ~ 0" :  (x, q) _> 0, Vq ~ O}. 04) 
q2 
\ r~ U 0 ~ e-Pareto- 
~0 ~jmaximal 
~Pareto- 
D = a2+ ~ maximal 
" / / / / / / / / / / /1 / / / / / / / /  
-T 
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The norm used in (14) is the norm of the dual space G* to the objective space, D* is 
the dual cone to D, and (., .) denotes the duality relation. If G = R n, then it is usually 
assumed that the weighting coefficients sum to one, which implies the sum of absolute 
values norm in (14) and the maximum norm for the objective space. If s is only 
subdifferentiable, any of its subgradients at4 can be used to define ~ in a similar way to 
(14). There are two important corollaries to Lemmas 1 and 2. 
Corollary 1. Suppose that an achievement function s is strictly or strongly order- 
preserving and upper semicontinuous in a topology in G. Suppose there is (1 ~ G such 
that the set (~/+ D)n  Q0 is compact in the same topology. Then there exist (possibly 
weakly) D-maximal points of set Q0- 
The proof of this corollary is simple. Weierstrass' theorem implies the existence of a 
maximum point 4 of s (q - (1 )  in the set ((1 +D)O Q0. By Lemma 1, this point is a 
(possibly weakly) D-maximal point of ((1 + D) O Q0- It is easy to check that it is also a 
(possibly weakly) D-maximal point of Q0. 
The second corollary establishes the fact that the boss is in full control of the 
organization if the staff preferences are described by an achievement scalarizing func- 
tion. 
Corollary 2. Suppose that an achievement function s is order-preserving and order- 
representing. Define the mapping ~ : G ~ t)0 = {4 E Q0:Q0 n (q +/5) = I~} by 
~((1) = arg min 114 - (111 for 4 ~ Arg max [s(q - (1)]. 
q~Q0 
The mapping is then onto. If an achievement function s is order-preserving and 
order-approximating and the mapping ~/ is defined as above but with ~:G-}00,  = 
{q E Q0 : Qo n (q +/),)  -- ~J}, then the mapping is again onto. 
The proof is simple: it is only necessary to show that for every 4 ~ Q0 or 4 E t)0, 
there exists a (1 E G such that 4((1) = q. Lemma 2 implies that it is sufficient to choose 
(1 = 4 to obtain ~(4) = 4. Although simple this result has an important interpretation: any 
desired nondominated and attainable point 4 ~ 00 or 4 E t)0, can be obtained by moving 
the reference point (aspiration level) (1, regardless of the other properties of the 
achievement function (e.g., the type of distance minimization or surplus allocation 
assumed in this function). 
Corollary 2 and the possibility of determining marginal a posteriori information ,~ 
from equation (14) also suggest hat the boss can alter (1 such that 4 = 4((1) finally 
converges to a maximum of his own value or utility function (under certain assumptions 
concerning the reasonableness of his strategy in changing ~/ [11]). 
Finally, consider another interpretation f the achievement scalarizing function s(q - 
t~). Let it represent he value function of a consumer under various institutional 
restrictions expressed by (1 and let these restrictions have a probability distribution p((1). 
After averaging over these restrictions, the average consumer's value or utility function 
is given by 
u(q) = S s(q - (1)p(~) d~. (15) 
G 
This function is order-preserving, since it is a generalized convex combination of order- 
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preserving functions. This represents another possible link between value optimization 
and satisficing decision making. 
4. EXAMPLES OF ACHIEVEMENT SCALARIZING FUNCTIONS 
The above theory will only be applicable if functions exist which satisfy the axiomatic 
requirements (a) and (b) from the previous section. Some examples of suitable functions 
are therefore presented below. 
Assume that G R", G -  " = -R+.  Let a utility (value) function u(q) be defined for 
q E R~ ; assume that the utility function is (i) nonnegative, u(g) >- 0 for q E R~, (ii) zero 
on the boundary of R~., u (q)=0 for q ~ OR+, and (iii) strictly order-preserving (not 
necessarily strongly order-preserving, since this is impossible for q E OR+). Now 
suppose that a threshold 4 ~ R" is defined, and the origin of the space shifted to this 
threshold; the utility function u(q - 4) is now defined only for q ~ 4 + RL The following 
expression can be used to define the function for q ~ 4 + R~ : 
s (q  - 4)  = u( (q  - 4 )+) -  o11(4 - q)+ll, (10  
where (.)+ denotes the positive part of a vector, 11(4 - q )+U = dist(q, 4 + R~), and p > 0 is 
a penalty coefficient. The function s(q - O) has two interpretations a used here. 
First, it is an extended (beyond) threshold utility function: it might describe the 
behavior of an average consumer both above and below a subsistence threshold 4. 
Above the threshold, the average consumer maximizes his utility u; below the threshold, 
his disutility corresponds to his distance from the subsistence l vel. 
Second, it is an achievement scalarizing function. It is clearly strictly order-preserv- 
ing: any norm in R" is strictly order-preserving for positive components (it cannot be 
strongly order-preserving if the maximum norm is used). It is also order-representing: 
Sod~f~--{q E R" : s(q - 4) >- O} = 4 + R~, 
since u((q - 4)+) will be positive only for q ~ 4 + R~. (If any component of the vector 
(q -  4) is negative or zero, then the corresponding component of the vector (q -  4)+ is 
zero, and u( (q -  4)+)= 0 for (q -  4)+ E aR~.) The function also expresses the idea of 
surplus allocation resulting from utility maximization if q -q  E R~, and the idea of 
distance minimization if q - 4 ~ R~. In fact, 
Arg min l lq  - 411 c Arg max[s(q - 0)1, 
q~Oo q~Oo 
if 4 ~ Q0- RL 
Various norms in R" and various utility functions can be used to define specific 
functions with the same general form as (16) [26]. One of the most useful is the following 
convex, piecewise linear function: 
s(q - 4) = min P min (q~ - 4~), (qi _ 4 ~) ; p _ n, 
l__i<_n = 
(17) 
where the superscripts denote vector components. Then, provided that the set E0 of 
admissible decisions x is described by linear inequalities and that all of the objective 
functions qi = Qi(x) are also linear, the maximization of (17) is equivalent o the 
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yEY0(q -0)  = y~R' :y<-p(q i -O l ) , i= l . . .n ;y  <- (q*-4 i )  . 
= 
(18) 
After solving this problem, the weighting coefficients }t can be determined a posteriori 
from the dual program. 
Another class of achievement functions is that of penalty scalarizing functions. These 
are constructed using the following simple reasoning: if q E 4 + RT, we maximize a norm 
or a component of q -  4; if q ~ 4 +R~, we penalize for the distance between q and 
4 + RL An example of this class is the following function 
s(q - 4 )  = IIq - 411-  p l l (4  - q)+ll ,  p > 1, (19)  
which is strictly order-preserving (strongly order-preserving for all norms in R" except he 
maximum norm) and order approximating with ~ -> 1/p [23]. If q~ 4 + R I, this function also 
expresses a specific idea of distance minimization: if 4~ Q0- R~, and 
then 
However, 
Arg max[s(q - 4)] C 00,, 
q~Q0 
Arg min I Iq - 411 c Arg max [s(q - 4)1. 
qe00. q~O0 
Arg max[s(q - ~)] 
qEQo 
is not always contained in 00,, although it is always contained in (weak) 00, because the 
function s (q -4)  is R~-order-preserving, not R~,-order-preserving. Depending on the 
norm chosen, this function also possesses various other properties [l l, 26]. 
Another example is the penalty function resulting from maximization of component q~ 
under (soft) constraints q2>> 42.. .  qn > 4n: 
s(q - 4) = q ' -  4 ' -  Pl](q' - q~)+]]R~-~; q' = (q2.. .q~)E R ~-'. (20) 
This function is frequently used to scan the Pareto set in multiobjective optimization; 
however, it is not generally known that this function is (strictly or strongly, depending on 
the norm) order-preserving for p > 0 and order approximating with ~ > lip. Thus any 
maximal point of this function, while not necessarily satisfying the constraints, is 
Pareto-maximal; and ~-Pareto-maximal point 4 = ~ is also maximal for this function. 
The penalty function (19) may easily be generalized for the case when G is a Hilbert 
space--for example, the space containing the trajectories of solutions to a continuous- 
time dynamic economic model. The corresponding equation is 
s (q  - 4 )  = IIq - 411- pll(4 - q )° ' l l ,  (21)  
where (.)D* denotes the operation of projection on the dual cone D*--- 
{q* E G* : (q*, q) -> 0, Vq ~ D} [22]. This function is strongly order-preserving, if p > 0 
and D C_ D*, and order-approximating with ¢ -< 1/p [21]. 
Thus, there are many forms of achievement function which fulfill our requirements, 
two of them (Eqs. 17 and 20) being particularly simple and easy to apply. 
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Observe, finally, that a maximal point ¢] of an achievement function s (q  - F/) depends 
on various factors: on the aspiration objective F/, on the choice of norm, on the choice of 
penalty coefficient p, and on the type of surplus allocation or utility used in extended 
threshold utility functions. However, as shown in the previous section, the influence of 
the reference objective F/ is of primary importance, the other factors having only a 
secondary effect. If a mathematical model is used in the decision-making process, these 
other factors can be specified by an optimization specialist: he can choose the norm 
most appropriate to the mathematical model (for example, if the model is linear he might 
choose the maximum norm, while if the model is nonlinear he might prefer the Euclidean 
norm); he can choose the penalty coefficient p such that the problem is not too badly 
conditioned, with reasonable violations of soft constraints; he can guess how to allocate 
a possible surplus q -F /ER~,  etc. These decisions are important in the sense of 
computational efficiency, but they are clearly not essential to the decision maker, who 
can choose any ¢] E 00 (or, at least, any t] E Q0,) by specifying and changing the value of 
F/. 
5. AN INTERACTIVE TECHNIQUE FOR SATISFICING DECISION 
MAKING VIA MULTIOBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION 
Let us now consider a practical interactive procedure for choosing a Pareto-maximal 
point. It is assumed that the actual decisions are made by a decision maker, and that the 
mathematical model and optimization techniques erve only as an aid in identifying the 
relevant part of the Pareto-maximal set. 
The decision maker is first presented with all the information he desires about the 
model being used to solve his problem. This may include the maximal and minimal evels 
of objective functions when maximized separately, and the corresponding decisions. He is 
then asked to specify the vector of aspiration levels for all objective functions, 
F/0 = (/]1... F/g) ~ R". For each vector of aspirations F/i, the computer esponds with the 
following: 
(1) The Pareto-maximal ttainable objective vector c]i, which is obtained by maximiz- 
ing an achievement function, and the corresponding weighting coefficients and 
decision variables; 
(2) A number (n) of other Pareto-maximal ttainable objective vectors t]i,j, j = 1 . . .  n, 
obtained by maximizing the achievement function with perturbed aspiration points: 
F/,,~ = 4, + diej; e~ = (o . . .  h , . .  0); d, = IIF/i- dill, (22) 
where dl is the distance between the vector of aspirations ~i and the attainable vector ~; 
ej is the jth unit basis vector. The advantage of perturbation (22) is that if the point ¢10 is 
distant from the Pareto set, the decision maker obtains a global description of the Pareto 
set through the points ~0j; if F/ is close to the Pareto set, then the points ~i.j provide a 
detailed description of the Pareto set in a neighborhood of the aspiration point F/i (see 
Fig. 2). 
The decision maker can now either choose one of the proposed alternatives, or 
change his aspiration point to F/~+,. This procedure can be refined by using the differences 
F/i+1 - ~i to identify the utility or value function of the decision maker; these differences 
can then be constrained so that the procedure converges to a point that maximizes the 
utility function. However, these refinements are not very important in practice; decision 
makers usually adopt the satisficing approach and choose one of the computer-generated 
alternatives relatively quickly. 
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Fig. 2. Interpretation f the interactive procedure. 
Similar procedures have been proposed by researchers working on goal programming 
in multiobjective optimization [17-19], although achievement functions have not been 
fully investigated in this field; questions uch as what to do if the aspiration level can be 
exceeded and how to choose the best norm have not yet been settled. Thus, the 
interactive procedure presented here can also be considered as a generalization of the 
goal programming approach. 
6. OTHER APPLICATIONS OF ACHIEVEMENT SCALARIZING FUNCTIONS 
Scanning the Pareto set 
When building a multiobjective optimization model, the analyst should at least 
attempt to scan the Pareto set, i.e., to obtain a representation f it. The author has found 
that an approach based on aspiration points and achievement scalarizing functions is 
effective in scanning the Pareto set, particularly if the number of objectives is very large, 
as in trajectory optimization. 
Trajectory optimization 
In typical dynamic optimization problems, single or multiple objectives are obtained 
by aggregating dynamic trajectories using integral functionals. However, experienced 
analysts, economists, and decision makers can often evaluate ntire trajectories (functions 
of time) better than aggregate integral indices. A decision maker experienced in evaluating 
trajectories can easily state his requirements in terms of an aspiration trajectory £/(t), a 
scalar- or vector-valued function of time; however, it would be very difficult o identify his 
preference relation in trajectory space. We should therefore construct an ad hoc 
achievement functional, possibly similar to (21), with G=L2[O;T] and D= 
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{q E L2[0; T] : q(t) -> 0 a.e. on [0; T]}: 
T 
s(q - (t) = fo ((q(t) - ~(t)) 2 - p(~(t) - q(t)) 2) dt. (23) 
If time is assumed to be discrete rather than continuous, the integral should be 
replaced by a sum and the problem becomes finite-dimensional. However, even in this 
case it is still more convenient to think in terms of trajectories than to consider separate 
objectives. This technique can be used (in economic models, for example) to obtain 
feasible and (generalized) Pareto-optimal trajectories that are either close to or better 
than any given aspiration trajectories. The concept of trajectory optimization via 
aspiration trajectories has been used by Kallio et al. [27] in a study of alternative policies 
for the Finnish forestry and forest-based industries. 
Semiregularization of solutions of mathematical models 
Any model that possesses many solutions or quasisolutions can be Tikhonov- 
regularized [28] by choosing the solution that is closest to a given reference point. 
Achievement functions actually represent a generalization of this idea: the principle of 
semiregularization. Consider function (20) and suppose that el' =((/',t]t), where t] s 
denotes the components of the reference objective which the solution should either be 
close to, or, if possible, exceed, and t] t denotes the components which the solution 
should be close to regardless of the sign of C/t- q'. The following penalty scalarizing 
function 
s(q  - q) = q ' -  q ' -  p*ll(q' - q0+U-  p'llq' - q'll, (24) 
is both order-preserving and order-approximating, in terms of the partial ordering 
defined by the cone 
D ={q ER"  :ql>-O,~"i >-O,q t'j =0}. 
Thus, scalarizing functions can also be used to represent components that should not 
move too far from the reference level in either direction. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS 
The main idea in constructing a mathematical basis for satisficing decision making is 
to introduce the wishes of the decision maker as basic a priori information in the form 
of aspiration levels. It is assumed that the decision maker is helped by his staff (or a 
mathematical model), which proposes attainable nondominated alternatives correspond- 
ing to the aspiration levels. Achievement scalarizing functions are then constructed; 
these are based on the aspiration levels, but also reflect the modified rationality of the 
staff by fulfilling the conditions of order approximation and order preservation. The first 
of these properties (order approximation) also results in a necessary condition for 
Pareto optimality, which is applicable to nonconvex problems and stronger than other 
known necessary conditions. Thus, the mathematical basis for satisficing decision 
making may be seen as an alternative approach to multiobjective optimization, in that it 
generalizes goal programming and utopia point techniques. It is also related to other 
problems, such as trajectory optimization or the problem of regularizing the solutions of 
badly defined mathematical models. However, this abstract basis is also eminently 
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pragmatic:  the basic idea of responding to the wishes of a decis ion maker  rather than 
tell ing him what his wishes should be results in a practical interactive procedure with 
inst i tut ional  implications. 
There are many problems still to be investigated: these include the use of aspirat ion 
object ives under  uncerta inty,  their use in hierarchical decis ion-making structures, and so 
on. Moreover ,  much still remains to be done simply in testing this approach more widely 
in many different fields and appl ications. 
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